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Afterword:  The Libertarian Middle Way 
Randy E. Barnett* 
Libertarians are often portrayed as radicals and, in a sense, this is 
accurate. The three senses of “radical” could each be said to characterize 
libertarianism: (1) “(especially of change or action) relating to or affecting 
the fundamental nature of something; far-reaching or thorough,” (2) 
“characterized by departure from tradition; innovative or progressive,” and 
(3) “of or relating to the root of something.”1 Libertarians do make claims 
about the fundamental nature of things, and strive to be thorough in the 
application of their principles. Libertarian policies often are a departure 
from tradition, though as we shall see, libertarianism is deeply rooted in the 
classical liberal western tradition associated with the Enlightenment (and 
its roots could easily be traced still farther back in time).2  Libertarians do 
strive to go to the root of how society should be structured, and they claim 
that root to be liberty.3 
But, although libertarians sometimes appear to place a primacy on 
liberty in the political sphere, to the exclusion of other ends, this 
appearance is deceptive and easily mischaracterized. As I will explain in 
this essay, while some libertarians may promote liberty as an end in itself, 
for most, liberty is a means to other ends. Liberty enables the individual 
who is living in society with others to pursue happiness, or the good life. 
The good life is an ultimate end consisting of a myriad of subordinate ends, 
from love to charity to excellence in one’s intellectual and physical powers. 
While all humans share a nature in common with others—the nature that 
differentiates us from other creatures—no human’s potential is exactly the 
same as any other. And our common nature requires that our virtues be 
developed from our own choices, not imposed from above. As my teacher 
Henry Veatch instructed, living a good life is a do-it-yourself affair.4 
 
 * Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center. 
Permission to reprint in whole or part for nonprofit educational purposes is hereby granted. 
 1 Radical Definition, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, http://oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/american_english/radical (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 2 See DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 27–52 (1997) (exploring the early history of 
libertarianism); GEORGE H. SMITH, THE SYSTEM OF LIBERTY: THEMES IN THE HISTORY OF CLASSICAL 
LIBERALISM (2013) (describing the basic tenets of classical liberalism). 
 3 On the origins of modern libertarianism, see BOAZ, supra note 2, at 52–58; BRIAN DOHERTY, 
RADICALS FOR CAPITALISM: A FREEWHEELING HISTORY OF THE MODERN AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN 
MOVEMENT passim (2007). 
 4 See, e.g., HENRY B. VEATCH, RATIONAL MAN: A MODERN INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTELIAN 
ETHICS (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2003) (1962); see also HENRY B. VEATCH, FOR AN ONTOLOGY OF MORALS: 
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So most libertarians hold the “radical” views they do for the very 
same types of reasons that others hold theirs: they believe that people will 
be better off in the highest sense if their liberties are acknowledged and 
respected. Libertarians would not bother to hold and advocate their views if 
they did not care about the well-being of others; they would just go about 
their business. Instead, they expend their scarce energy and resources 
learning which social structures work best, and which worse, and then 
advance their answers against the contending alternatives. 
In this sense, then, libertarians are no more “radical” than others who 
advocate societal reform by identifying goals towards which they think 
social structures should strive. They just have a different view of how 
society should be structured so as to make people better off. But the point I 
want to make in this essay is that libertarianism is the opposite of radical, if 
by radical, you mean extreme. Libertarianism today is actually a moderate 
middle ground between two contemporary extremes: the social justice 
crowd on the Left, and the legal moralists on the Right (though both 
positions have much in common, there is no logical reason why one cannot 
hold both at the same time, as some do, and what is considered "left" and 
"right" will vary over time). 
THE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL MORALIST EXTREMES5 
The social justice crowd holds some version of the view that everyone 
is entitled to some quantum of stuff; and if they do not have whatever it is 
that a particular social justice theorist thinks they ought to have, we need a 
coercive government with the power to take from those who have this stuff 
and give it to those who do not. This sometimes also entails that no one 
should have any, or too much, more stuff than anyone else. Whether the 
standard be absolute or comparative, however, social justice consists of 
everyone having whatever they are supposed to have according to the 
advocate of social justice. 
There are at least three fundamental problems associated with this 
position. The first is that there is no single and salient answer to what 
everyone is supposed to have. Almost everyone who advocates for social 
justice has either a different view of this or, more commonly in my 
experience, no firm view they are willing to articulate. For example, try 
asking someone who says that “the rich” are not paying their “fair share” of 
 
A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORY (1971). 
 5 In this section, I offer some generalizations about the approaches I label as “social justice” and 
“legal moralism.” These descriptions are based on my experience as an academic listening to such 
views being offered by my colleagues, and in more popular discourse, and I do not offer any specific 
iterations by particular advocates. Instead, I paint with a broad brush. The persuasiveness of this 
critique will turn on whether the descriptions I offer seem to match the reader’s own exposure to these 
views. For example, if, unlike me, the reader is aware of specific structural proposals (apart from 
invocations of democracy) by advocates of these views to ensure that the correct conception of either 
social justice or legal moralism is initially adopted and maintained over time, then my claim that there 
are no such generally-accepted proposals will be undermined.  
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taxes, “OK, what is the “fair share?” You will either get a blank look or a 
single word answer: “more.” Whatever the “well-off” are now paying, they 
should be paying more. Whatever the less-well-off have, they should have 
more. How much more? Not saying. Just more.   
This lack of specificity makes crafting actual policies extremely 
unstable. There is no core position around which any political consensus 
may be formed. There is no identifiable limit beyond which the policy of 
redistribution can be deemed unjust. Even if the existence of consensus is 
an unrealistic demand to make of social justice advocates, in its absence, 
whatever policy may actually be implemented will be politically unstable. 
Only the subgroup that favors the prevailing plan will be satisfied that 
social justice is being done. No matter how much redistribution of income 
or wealth is adopted, there will always be cries for more or different forms, 
which will greatly undermine the security of everyone’s possessions, and 
the ability to plan. Then there are the many who will persist in objecting to 
using force to achieve social justice. This is not a recipe for a peaceful and 
contented society. 
A second problem is that achieving any particular pattern of 
distribution will require enormously intrusive government administrative 
mechanisms. Some subset of a society will need to be given special powers 
to collect the information of everyone’s wealth or income. This is not some 
accidental occurrence that can somehow be avoided; it is absolutely 
necessary to know from whom to take the wealth and to whom to give it 
according to the approved pattern of social justice. Collecting this 
information will necessarily be privacy invasive, and the existence of a 
database with such information can lead to the intimidation of dissidents.  
Finally, a third problem was identified most prominently by Robert 
Nozick: whatever level of redistribution is adopted will require the 
continual use of force to achieve and maintain over time. The natural 
outcome of liberty will inevitably destroy whatever pattern of holdings is 
adopted as the socially “just” one.6 In addition to collecting the relevant 
information to discover how actual holdings differ from this pattern, some 
subset of persons will need to be empowered to use force to continually 
adjust holdings so they conform. 
These three fundamental problems lead to the following mega-
problem with social justice policies: Any institution powerful enough to 
gather this information and enforce the pattern will be highly intrusive and 
enormously dangerous. Not only will it have the exceptional power to 
violate the background rights that libertarians advocate as the prerequisite 
for pursuing happiness in a social context, it will also have the power to 
deviate from the pattern favored by any particular social justice advocate. 
These institutions of coercion may adopt a different vision of social 
 
 6 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 160–64 (1974) (describing how liberty 
upsets patterns). 
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justice—or other ends entirely, such as legal moralism—that will violate 
the conception of social justice favored by any given proponent. And when 
one acknowledges realistically that there is no uniquely salient pattern of 
distribution, the highly contested nature of social justice makes the 
potential for abuse even greater. Because one cannot prove one’s 
conception is the right one, a perpetual struggle to control the institutions of 
coercion becomes inevitable, unless dissenters are somehow suppressed or 
eliminated, which historically is what happens to dissidents in societies 
committed to some conception of social justice. 
It is not enough, therefore, for social justice advocates to identify a 
uniquely salient pattern of holdings as the socially just one, though this is 
essential. They must also identify the structural features of a legal system 
that can assure that the just pattern—and only the just pattern—will be 
adopted, and that the powers required to monitor and perpetuate the just 
pattern will not be captured and abused to the detriment of social justice. I 
am not even asking for an ironclad guarantee, but merely a reasonable 
assurance that some approximation of the right pattern of social justice will 
be adopted initially and maintained over time. In my experience, such 
assurances have not been forthcoming. 
Legal moralists have a comparable set of problems. Indeed, we can 
simply port much of the above analysis of social justice over to legal 
moralism. Legal moralists focus their attention, not on how much stuff each 
person has, but on how each person ought to act when living his or her life. 
Each person should behave just the way legal moralists believe he or she 
ought to behave or be sanctioned by law. However, like social justice 
proponents, legal moralists disagree among themselves about the correct 
set of moral behaviors.   
Of course, all legal moralists would maintain that acts like murder, 
rape, robbery, and theft, which violate the rights of others, should be 
banned—a belief they share in common with libertarians. For this reason, 
to preserve the distinction between libertarianism and legal moralism, it is 
important to distinguish between justice—which consists of prohibiting 
“wrongful” conduct that violates the rights of others—and morality or 
ethics, which evaluates the full gamut of human action to distinguish good 
from bad conduct.   
All libertarians, and most everyone else, believe that force is justified 
to prohibit unjust or wrongful behavior; but legal moralists would extend 
the use of force to reach some or all immoral or unethical conduct as well. 
But while the consensus that murder, rape, robbery and theft are wrongful 
and may be legally forbidden is widespread—indeed universal—there is no 
comparable consensus about how all people ought to act, or which moral 
code should be imposed on a society.  
Assuming some uniquely salient moral code was identified, however, 
like social justice advocates, legal moralists require a powerful and 
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intrusive set of legal institutions to gather information on how everyone is 
behaving in public or private to detect whether they are behaving morally 
or not. Any institution that is powerful enough to accomplish this would be 
susceptible to enormous abuse. And this potential for abuse is even greater 
than it would be if a uniquely salient moral code were capable of being 
identified, which is a prerequisite for confining those who hold power to 
those identifiable limits. 
IS DEMOCRACY THE ANSWER? 
When confronted by these inherent and fundamental problems with 
their positions, both social justice advocates and legal moralists tend to 
offer the same response: democracy. We just let people vote on the correct 
pattern of distribution, the correct moral code, or both. But this is simply 
avoiding the issue by creating a “black box” solution. Although majority 
rule might arrive at some outcome, given the contested nature of both 
concepts, it is not likely to be a stable outcome as winners must continually 
fend off losers. And this solution assumes, of course, that democracy is 
maintained after the initial vote, which is not typically the case in countries 
pursuing either a social justice or legal moralist agenda.   
More fundamentally, how exactly is majority rule supposed to arrive 
at policies of either social justice or morality that are correct according to 
the theories of social justice or morality advanced by any particular 
proponent? What sorts of arguments about the right outcome could political 
advocates even make? What would a legislative debate about the right 
distribution or correct morality look like beyond a mere assertion of one’s 
conclusion in the form of one’s vote? In short, what exactly makes the 
majority’s vote (on any given day) the right outcome from the standpoint 
of either social justice or morality?  
Yet, if there is no assurance that a majority of a group of individuals 
who are denominated “legislators” or “representatives,” or a majority of the 
body politic voting in a referendum, will vote for the right outcome, then 
how exactly is democracy the solution to the problem of the radical 
indeterminacy of the social justice or legal moralist perspectives? Far from 
being a solution to the problem of arriving at the right conception of social 
justice or legal morality, the appeal to democracy either disguises or merely 
restates the problem and then sweeps it under the rug. 
In the end, both social justice and legal moralism assume a “God’s eye 
view” of either how all physical resources in a given society should be 
allocated or how all persons should behave in their personal and public 
lives. Indeed, one could easily conclude that social justice proponents and 
legal moralists are simply substituting a secular government for an 
interventionist God to create their own heaven on earth. But any such 
project is simply beyond the capacity of the actual human beings we must 
rely upon to devise and implement such a scheme. Hypothesizing about the 
demos does not solve, or even seriously address, this problem. 
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Moreover, because both social justice and legal moralist visions are 
comprehensive approaches to social arrangements, any preferred position 
necessarily implies the rejection of all competing positions. To adopt any 
one pattern of distribution is to reject all other contending patterns; to adopt 
any one moral code is to reject all alternative moral codes. Not only do the 
comprehensive natures of both approaches make them inherently 
unstable—as those who favor alternative conceptions continue to agitate 
for their view of “justice” or “morality”—but this very instability has 
historically engendered highly coercive and often brutal measures to 
suppress dissent from the prevailing position. Whether enforced brutally or 
not, however, every loser of this perpetual struggle must be forced to live 
their life in a regime that he or she takes to be unjust or immoral. The 
inevitable result of this dynamic is a Hobbesian war of all against all.  
THE ROOTS OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM IN RELIGIOUS TOLERATION 
While I wish I could claim that any of the foregoing analysis is new or 
original, the recognition of these problems is as old as liberalism itself. 
Indeed, the origin of classical liberalism, which begat modern 
libertarianism, can be traced to the devastating consequences of religious 
wars during which comprehensive religious views fought violently against 
each other. And why should contending religions not take up arms against 
their rivals? If eternal salvation is at stake, and salvation requires living in a 
society in which others all believe accordingly, why should religion not be 
fought over to the death? Nor has this stance been eradicated from 
modernity. We see it today in the radical Islamist jihadist movement that is 
gaining steam in a large part of the world, both in its deadliest form and in 
its drive to adopt Sharia law in “democratic” societies that is then 
coercively imposed on believers and nonbelievers alike.  
The classical liberal solution to the problem of religious wars was 
religious toleration: the view that matters of conscience were matters of 
individual choice.7 Notwithstanding that one’s eternal soul might be at 
stake, these proto-liberals contended that it was better for individuals to be 
free to choose their religions than to adopt a comprehensive one-religion-
for-all policy that led to perpetual and deadly domestic and foreign strife.   
Those favoring toleration need not, and did not, deny that one religion 
was right and the rest were wrong; in other words, they need not adopt the 
stance of religious relativism. Instead, they needed only to recognize that 
the determination of which religion was the true one was sufficiently 
contestable, and inevitably contested, as to make the imposition of one 
religion on all a highly unstable and destructive approach to social 
ordering. Even from the point of view of religious truth, while the best 
outcome might be to have one’s own true religion imposed on others, the 
 
 7 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 18 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1950) 
(1689) (advocating for religious toleration). 
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worst outcome would be to have another’s false religion imposed on you. 
Everyone’s second-best outcome is to be free to exercise his or her own 
religion without imposing on others, which makes this policy the most 
stable and conducive to social peace. 
For this reason, rather than have one religion imposed coercively by a 
monarch, the liberal solution to religious strife was for each individual to 
be considered the King or sovereign of his own conscience. Each 
individual was to live side-by-side with other individual sovereigns of their 
own conscience, the way monarchs of countries under the Treaty of 
Westphalia were supposed to live in peace with their neighbors and to 
refrain from forcibly interfering with the internal affairs of other sovereign 
monarchs.  
For Westphalian monarchical sovereignty to work, however, the 
geographical borders within which each monarch was free to determine 
internal domestic policies without outside interference must be identifiable 
and established. By the same token, the individual sovereignty entailed by 
religious toleration requires the identification and establishment of 
boundaries within which individuals have the jurisdiction to choose how to 
worship. While matters of conscience lie entirely within one’s mind, the 
practice or free exercise of religion requires action, and action requires the 
use of physical resources.  
What physical resources are properly within the boundaries of 
individual sovereigns? The liberal answer to this jurisdictional question 
was the concept of private property: property in one’s own person, and also 
in external possessions. As Locke put it, the commonwealth is “a society of 
men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their 
own civil interests.”8 These interests are “life, liberty, health, and indolency 
of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, 
houses, furniture, and the like.”9 
It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to 
secure unto all the people in general, and to every one of his subjects in 
particular, the just possession of these things belonging to this life. If anyone 
presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity, established for the 
preservation of those things, his presumption is to be checked by the fear of 
punishment consisting of the deprivation or diminution of those civil interests or 
goods which otherwise he might and ought to enjoy. But seeing no man does 
willingly suffer himself to be punished by the deprivation of any part of his 
goods, and much less of his liberty or life, therefore is the magistrate armed with 
the force and strength of all his subjects, in order to the punishment of those that 
violate any other man’s rights.10 
With this conception of the proper scope of civil government, Locke 
concluded that, because “the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches 
 
 8 Id. at 17. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
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only to these civil concernments . . . all civil power, right and dominion is 
bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things” and “it 
neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of 
souls.”11  
Nor could the power to impose religious belief “be vested in the 
magistrate by the consent of the people.”12 This is because some rights are 
inalienable, meaning they cannot be surrendered to government even by 
consent. 
[N]o man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to 
the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith 
or worship he shall embrace. For no man can, if he would, conform his faith to 
the dictates of another. All the life and power of true religion consist in the 
inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing.13  
In this way, individual sovereignty with respect to matters of conscience 
took priority over any collective consent. 
In sum, the liberal solution to the Hobbesian war of all-against-all 
created by comprehensive religious claims was not to posit a sovereign 
monarch or Leviathan to settle on the true religion for all—indeed that was 
the source of religious wars—but instead to shift the conception of 
sovereignty over religious belief and exercise from the monarch to the 
people, with “the people” referring to the plural of individual persons, each 
with his or her own conscience. As explained by Locke, “one man does not 
violate the right of another by his erroneous opinions and undue manner of 
worship, nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man’s affairs, 
therefore, the care of each man’s salvation belongs only to himself.”14  
Building upon this insight, the Lockean jurisdictional solution to the 
social strife created by comprehensive religious claims came gradually to 
be adopted to handle lesser conflicts over mere moral disagreements. Just 
as the jurisdictions of sovereign monarchs are limited to their respective 
geographical territories, the jurisdiction of sovereign individuals is limited 
to their bodies and their justly acquired physical possessions. As in 
international relations, force is justified to keep everyone within their 
boundaries but, so long as they are operating within their respective 
jurisdictions and not invading the rightful jurisdiction or domains of others, 
individuals should be free to make their own moral choices. Just like the 
King. 
The more decisions that are viewed as matters of individual 
sovereignty, the more “libertarian” this approach becomes. Indeed, modern 
libertarianism can be viewed as the push to see how many types of 
decisions can feasibly be delegated to the realm of individual sovereignty. 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 18. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 46. 
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The debate between libertarians and others, and among libertarians 
themselves, is precisely about how far this process of delegation can be 
taken. 
It is inaccurate to characterize this argument for delegation as 
premised on some “atomistic individualism” that assumes that each man is 
an island independent of others in society, any more than did Westphalian 
monarchical sovereignty assume atomistic nation states. To the contrary, 
what is sought are the prerequisites of peaceful social coexistence in a 
world in which each person’s actions are very likely to affect others. As 
with conflicts between contending nation states that are resolved by 
recognizing political sovereignty, the problems of social conflict and 
interdependence are solved, rather than denied, by the recognition of 
individual sovereignty. 
True, historically, in the United States as elsewhere, whole categories 
of persons were denied the individual sovereignty that this approach favors. 
African slaves were under the jurisdiction of their masters, as were white 
indentured servants from Europe. Daughters were deemed to be under the 
jurisdiction of their fathers and wives of their husbands, with legally 
independent single adult women considered anomalies. This did not entail 
that the individual sovereignty approach was wrong, but merely that the 
delegation of jurisdiction was incomplete. Having devolved from the 
paternal King to the slaveholder or to the father of the family, it needed to 
go still farther to recognize the sovereignty of each adult, regardless of the 
irrelevant characteristics of race or sex.  
As we know, the partial delegation that existed at the time of the 
Founding of the United States was merely a way station to the completely 
egalitarian devolution of jurisdiction to the individual. Indeed, the liberal 
case for the “natural rights” of private property and freedom of contract 
provided a potent argument against both slavery and legal paternalism.15   
This is not to say that no person today remains under the jurisdiction 
of others. Children are under the jurisdiction of their guardians, and the 
mentally incompetent can be the wards of others as well. But these 
exceptions are fully consistent with the fundamental premise that all 
competent persons sui juris are the proper rulers of themselves. Indeed, any 
scheme by which the properly defined jurisdiction of fully competent 
persons is overridden by the will of others treats sovereign individuals as 
though they were children or mentally infirm (or women under coverture or 
slaves). And any scheme that denies or disparages individual sovereignty 
also presupposes that whoever is given the authority to rule individual 
adults—whether a monarch or some faction of society—is superior in some 
manner to the individual sui juris, a claim that begins to replicate the 
 
 15 See Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One?: The Abolitionist Origins of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165 (2011) (discussing abolitionist constitutionalism). 
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dynamic that led to the religious wars, and was used to justify slavery and 
the subordination of women. 
THE MODESTY OF MODERN LIBERTARIANISM 
It should now be clear that modern libertarianism merely takes 
individual sovereignty seriously, and tries to push this concept as far as it 
can feasibly go. For libertarians, as for Locke, “private property” is the 
concept that defines the proper jurisdiction of each sovereign person who is 
sui juris or competent to manage his or her own affairs. And freedom of 
contract governs the transfers of these property rights from one person to 
another. The proposition that one should not have one’s justly acquired 
property taken by others without one’s consent is inimical to schemes of 
social justice.  
“Liberty” for a libertarian, then, is not the Hobbesian freedom to do 
whatever you will. Instead, it is the Lockean freedom to do whatever you 
will with what is yours. There is simply no libertarianism without 
jurisdictional limits on freedom of action; the concept of property defines 
these limits and is what differentiates liberty from license. Libertarianism is 
distinctive in its attempt to limit coercion to the protection of these 
jurisdictional boundaries to the greatest practicable extent. Forcible 
interference by some with the liberty that is within the sovereign 
jurisdiction of others is as offensive to libertarianism as the unprovoked 
forcible interference of one national sovereign within the boundaries of 
another is offensive to the prevailing view of international relations. 
However “radical” this might sound in the abstract, it is actually a far 
more modest approach than either social justice or legal moralism. 
Although the line between “mine and thine” must be drawn, doing so is far 
more practical than specifying the morality of the entirety of human action. 
Although rules and principles governing the just acquisition, use, and 
transfer of property must be identified, this is a far more manageable and 
less divisive and dangerous a task than continually readjusting the 
distribution of holdings, suppressing the acquisition of property altogether, 
or identifying a stable principle of “fair share.”  
Moreover, because proponents of social justice and legal moralism 
typically propose superimposing their schemes onto existing structures of 
private property and freedom of contract, rather than supplanting them 
altogether, these stances are necessarily more ambitious than simply 
limiting legal coercion to the libertarian core that must still be ascertained 
and enforced. Put another way, no matter how challenging the task of 
properly defining the proper jurisdictions of individual sovereigns may be, 
adding considerations of social justice, legal moralism, or both, to this task 
is that much more challenging. In this sense, libertarianism is necessarily 
more modest than either social justice or legal moralism. 
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In contrast with the tyrannies we have witnessed in the social justice 
of the U.S.S.R. and the legal moralism of the Muslim world, the most 
objectionable version of a libertarian political system we have experienced, 
in which the sovereignty of a portion of the citizenry was denied, evolved 
in a more, rather than less, egalitarian direction. The recognition of 
individual sovereignty creates a virtuous circle that tends to eliminate 
whatever irrelevant legal discrimination was inherited from a more ancient 
and illiberal legal tradition. 
DO SOCIAL DEMOCRACIES PROVIDE A BETTER MIDDLE WAY? 
What about the social democracies of Western Europe or, to a lesser 
but increasing extent, the now-expanding social welfare state in the United 
States? Do not these political systems combine the individual sovereignty 
of private property with the redistribution of social justice, as well as some 
degree of legal moralism? Do these not represent the true “middle 
ground”—or what was once called the Third Way—between an 
unconstrained system of either social justice or legal moralism on the one 
hand and the unconstrained liberty of libertarianism on the other? If these 
types of political arrangements are feasible, does this not undermine the 
libertarian objection to social justice, legal moralism, or both? 
In some ways, the answer to this last question is “yes.” Superimposing 
a degree of wealth or income redistribution, or morals legislation, on a 
robust base of private property is infinitely preferable to the radical, single-
minded pursuit of either social justice or legal moralism. But this response 
to the case for libertarianism is really a concession, rather than a genuine 
objection. For it concedes that libertarian principles of property provide a 
necessary baseline upon which some less-than-total scheme of 
redistribution or moral regulation can be superimposed, notwithstanding 
that the existence of this baseline is often contested by intellectuals on the 
Left. 
Moreover, the challenge posed to libertarianism by social democracy 
assumes its feasibility. But what if such an approach is infeasible? What if 
superimposing social justice or legal moralism on the individual 
sovereignty defined by private property and freedom of contract is 
ultimately unstable? Why might this be? 
Perhaps institutions with sufficient power to effectuate social justice 
or to impose morality will inevitably be captured by the more powerful 
forces in society and put to other ends. Perhaps they will inevitably be used 
for a purpose that does not conform to the proper conception of social 
justice or morality. After all, as noted above, what realistic assurances have 
we ever been offered that such power can be limited to whatever theory is 
being advanced to justify its creation?  
What happens in a social democracy when 51% of the voters discover 
it can vote to “redistribute” the wealth of—or impose their moral vision 
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upon—the other 49%? Or more likely, what happens when political 
entrepreneurs inspire, say, 80% of the electorate to confiscate the income or 
wealth of the 20%? When this happens, how will social democracy 
preserve the individual sovereignty that the Third Way approach concedes 
is needed as a baseline? What realistic mechanisms are proposed by 
advocates of the Third Way superimposition of social justice or legal 
moralism on the libertarian rights of property and contract to ensure against 
this outcome? 
I have been teaching law and writing about liberty for over thirty years 
now, and I have yet to hear any such proposal from any of my colleagues. 
It would be genuinely enlightening to hear how advocates of supplanting or 
overriding the libertarian rights that define individual sovereignty propose 
to limit the coercive powers they seek to the particular vision of social 
justice or morality that they offer to justify this claim of power. It would be 
equally enlightening to hear proponents of social democracy tell us how it 
will not eventually devour the individual rights that provide the foundation 
for their additional schemes of redistribution or morals regulation. Is this 
not a reasonable request? 
LIBERTARIAN APPROACHES TO LIMITING GOVERNMENTAL POWER 
In contrast, libertarians do offer a solution or two to the problem of 
limiting government power to the protection of individual sovereignty. 
Like their classical liberal ancestors, most modern libertarians favor 
constitutionally-limited government, in which power is structurally divided 
among different branches of a federal or national government, and between 
the limited powers of the national government and the broader police 
powers of states and municipalities.  
These libertarians also typically favor the enforcement of these limits 
by what Madison called, “independent tribunals of justice.” In particular, 
they believe that, although state legislatures have a general police power to 
prohibit the actions of some individuals that violate the sovereignty of 
others, when legislatures wish instead to “regulate” the otherwise rightful 
exercise of liberty by sovereign individuals, these regulations must be 
justified as reasonably necessary to protect the rights, health, and safety of 
other sovereign individuals. When disputes about whether such regulations 
are reasonably necessary to protect the right of others arise between the 
individuals who comprise a “legislature” and the sovereign individuals 
whose actions are the subject of these regulations—that is between the 
agents and their principals—the benefit of the doubt ought to go to the 
principals rather than those who are supposed to be their agents.  
In short, these libertarians favor something very much like, if not 
identical to, the original meaning of the Constitution of the United States—
the whole Constitution, including those parts that protect the unenumerated 
rights retained by the people and the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States. In this, however, they are today opposed to their left by 
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“progressives” who wish to achieve their vision of social justice at the 
national level by “interpreting” federal power broadly enough to address 
any problem they deem to be “national” in scope—which is to say every 
problem.  
To their right, libertarians are also opposed by social conservatives 
some of whom maintain that majorities in state legislatures have the right 
to enact their moral preferences into law, unconstrained by any judicially-
enforced limits on their ability to restrict the liberty of the sovereign 
individual citizen.16 These conservatives deny that judges have the power 
to protect the liberty of the individual by ensuring that legislatures are truly 
exercising a proper conception of their textually unenumerated police 
power. Since the Constitution contains few express limitations on the 
legislative power of states—and what limits it does provide have largely 
been interpreted out of existence—these conservatives contend that states 
have a virtually unlimited power to legislate morality. 
Put more positively, libertarians side with progressives against the 
legal moralism of the social conservatives, and with the conservatives 
against the social justice agenda of progressives. In this regard, they can be 
viewed as an independent or “swing” vote between the left and right. 
Indeed, many progressives would prefer living in a libertarian world to 
having the moral code of social conservatives imposed upon them. And 
many social conservatives would prefer the libertarian world in which they 
are left alone to practice their religion than to have the progressive’s vision 
of social justice (or secular morality) imposed upon them. Like religious 
toleration, for many who favor a comprehensive social system, the 
libertarian vision is their second-best option, with the first best being their 
own comprehensive vision of social justice or morality being imposed on 
everyone, and their last best being their opponent’s comprehensive vision 
imposed upon them. 
But libertarians have not one but two responses to how the coercive 
power needed for individual sovereignty can be confined to its only proper 
function of protecting individual sovereignty. Having observed the 
continued decline of respect for the limits on state and federal power 
contained in the U.S. Constitution, some libertarians favor a more radical 
alternative. They would see law enforcement and adjudication be handled 
competitively rather than by monopolistic government agencies.17 They 
favor consumer choice and competition as the best check on the abuse of 
the powers of law enforcement.18 While this alternative is highly 
controversial, even among libertarians, it should at least be mentioned in a 
 
 16 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 124 (1990) (“Moral outrage is a sufficient ground for prohibitory legislation.”). 
 17 See, e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO 215–
41 (rev. ed. 1996) (discussing police protection and judicial services provided by free market). 
 18 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
257–83 (1998) (discussing feasibility of a polycentric legal order). 
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discussion of institutional mechanisms favored by libertarians to keep the 
use of power within the boundaries that libertarians, along with most 
others, take to be just.   
In contrast with advocates of social justice or legal moralism, then, 
libertarians and their classical liberal forbearers have paid considerable 
attention to how government power can be limited to the protection of the 
rights defining individual sovereignty that libertarians favor. However 
persuasive their responses to this problem may be, they cannot be accused 
of ignoring it or treating it with less than the seriousness this problem 
deserves. 
LIBERTARIANISM AND LAW 
With all this as background, we are in a better position to understand 
the contribution that libertarianism can make to law. The first contribution 
is to identify the proper boundaries of individual sovereignty. Historically, 
this has been done by the private law subjects of property, contract, and 
torts. At the risk of oversimplification, the law of property governs the 
acquisition of land and possessions, the law of contract governs the 
consensual transfer of entitlements from one person to another, and the law 
of torts defines the proper use of property. For better or worse, these 
common-law subjects have historically provided the positive law that 
identifies the scope of individual sovereignty. Although the existing law of 
these subjects may not be perfectly libertarian, they have nevertheless been 
libertarian to a remarkable degree.  
Libertarianism is an abstract theory, in the sense that the principles of 
private property and freedom of contract that define liberty are derived 
from an abstract description of human beings and the social context in 
which they exist. By this I mean that libertarianism is essentially egalitarian 
insofar as it is based on those abstract qualities that all humans share in 
common with each other, rather than on the particularities that differentiate 
one person from another. Because these principles are derived from an 
abstracted understanding of human beings, however, libertarian principles 
are themselves highly abstract—often too abstract to handle anything but 
the most basic social conflicts. Murder, rape, robbery, theft and the like are 
unjust and to be legally prohibited. But one learns quickly in law school 
and in practice that the particularities of human social interaction are often 
far too complex to be regulated by these abstract principles of justice alone.  
For this reason, we not only need an abstract and often 
underdeterminate conception of justice, but also a rule of law. We need 
largely conventional rules and principles to apply to the particularities of 
the actual conflicts that arise in complex societies. While these legal rules 
and principles are constrained by the abstract principles of justice, they 
cannot be logically derived from them.19 
 
 19 See id. at 108–14 (discussing the underdeterminacy of abstract principles of justice). 
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Libertarian legal theorists therefore operate within the private law 
pretty much the same way other legal theorists do. Their distinctive 
perspective is the stress they place on the overriding social importance of 
defining the individual’s sovereignty by means of property, contract, and 
tort, preserving the discretion of individual choice within the boundaries 
that these concepts provide, and resisting the effort to override these 
concepts with claims based on social justice or legal moralism.  
So, for example, my contracts scholarship has stressed the role of the 
consent of the parties, as opposed to using contract law to effectuate other 
social ends.20 As someone who has participated in the debate over the 
proper basis of contractual obligation for several decades, I can testify that 
the libertarian position is a meaningful alternative to those that would have 
consent discounted, or disregarded altogether, in favor of other objectives, 
be they social justice, morality, or efficiency.  
Libertarian legal theorists typically conceive the protection of these, 
the basic private law rights of individual sovereignty, as the ultimate 
justification for the public law. Conceptually they advance the proposition 
that “first comes rights, and then comes government”—or as the 
Declaration of Independence affirmed, all men are equally endowed “with 
certain unalienable Rights” and that “to secure these rights, Governments 
are instituted among Men.”21  
As discussed above, they view a written constitution as one means, 
among others, of confining the coercive power of government to its proper 
function of protecting the individual’s private law rights. To this end, some 
libertarians defend the importance of a written constitution that is enforced 
by an independent judiciary.22 They evaluate the legitimacy of any 
constitution, including the Constitution of the United States, by this 
criterion: how well does it protect the private rights of all persons in the 
jurisdiction in which it governs?23 Many, if not most, libertarians believe 
that if the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution—as amended to extend 
the equal protection of the laws to women and those who had previously 
been enslaved—was actually followed, it would largely keep government 
within its proper powers.   
 
 20 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) 
(discussing consent theory of contract). For a later and more developed summary, see RANDY E. 
BARNETT, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CONTRACTS (2010). 
 21 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Of course, the full quote reads as 
follows:  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . . 
 22 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 100–12 (2004) (discussing the importance of a written constitution).  
 23 See, e.g., id. at 32–52 (discussing constitutional legitimacy without consent). 
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THE LIBERTARIAN FOCUS ON MEANS RATHER THAN ENDS 
In the end, there emerges a fundamental contrast between social 
justice and legal moralism on the one hand and libertarianism on the other: 
Advocates of social justice and legal moralism are concerned with “ends” 
to the exclusion of any serious consideration of means. All persons should 
have X amount of stuff. All persons should act, or refrain from acting, in 
certain ways. In addition to the failure to reach anything close to 
consensus—even among themselves—on what these ends should be, what 
is principally lacking is any serious attention to (a) the means by which 
one’s favored end will be achieved, and (b) how the coercive institutions 
will be limited to just these correct ends without being perverted to pursue 
other ends that are deemed by any particular social justice or legal moralist 
to be unjust and immoral. 
In contrast, libertarianism is concerned almost exclusively with means 
rather than with ends. Even the fundamental rights of private property and 
freedom of contract that principally define liberty are conceived by 
libertarians as means to the pursuit of happiness while living in society 
with others, rather than as ends in themselves. To be sure, the protection of 
these rights is treated as the end of government, but only because 
government itself is perceived by many libertarians as a regrettably 
necessary means of protecting property and contract.  
Of course, libertarians are seriously concerned with one end: the 
pursuit of the good life, or what the Declaration referred to as “the pursuit 
of happiness.” It is this end that motivates their commitment to such means 
as private rights and constitutionally-limited government. But, as was 
described above, most libertarians believe that liberty is necessary precisely 
because the end of happiness will vary with the uniquely varying 
circumstances, goals and aspirations of particular individuals, and because 
living the good life is a do-it-yourself affair. Therefore, just as something 
like the private law concepts of property, contract and torts are an 
inescapable means to the pursuit of happiness in a social context, the search 
for effective means of limiting the exercise of governmental power to the 
protection of just these private law rights is the proper subject of the public 
law.  
Imprecations to the contrary notwithstanding, libertarians are far more 
concerned with the actual real-world practicalities of using legal coercion 
than those who only focus on the ends of social justice or legal moralism. 
Real world experience, libertarians maintain, has demonstrated that 
governmental implementation of either social justice or legal moralism has 
led to dystopias almost beyond our ability to imagine. In contrast, even an 
imperfect commitment to private individual rights and limited 
constitutional government has led to the greatest prosperity in human 
history.  
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Of course, none of this is easy to prove. If it were, libertarianism 
would have either vanquished its intellectual foes or been defeated by 
them. But consider what may be the ultimate empirical proof of the 
superiority of even imperfectly adhering to libertarian principles: Which 
way do the refugees run? Which countries need to restrict the exit of their 
citizens? Were people clamoring to get into or out of the U.S.S.R.? Are 
they lined up to enter the Mullocracy of Iran? To the extent they can, 
people vote with their feet for the increased prosperity and choice made 
possible by the more robust protection of property as compared with other 
governmental systems. Persons who are capable of relocating tend to leave 
societies preoccupied by the pursuit of social justice or legal morality, and 
beat a path to the door of societies who pursue some semblance of the 
libertarian middle way. As empirical proofs go, this one is probably as 
good as any other.  
Given that there is no truly libertarian society, this is a comparative 
matter. Which societies better protect the rights of property and contract 
than others? But, in the end, this too is why libertarianism is modest. 
Libertarians formulate and advance their models of complete liberty as a 
means of incrementally inching existing societies in a more libertarian 
direction. Libertarians believe that good things will happen as this progress 
is made, and if we ever reach a point where the protection of property 
rights is having a counterproductive effect, we can stop there. In the 
meantime, we have a long way to go before we reach that point. Or so says 
the libertarian middle way. 
